

Development for Well-Being: Analysis and Assessment

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Abstract

Development has been very much an enlightenment project widening its scope to human freedom nurturing its project with the progress of science. The application of scientific outlook in the development discourse has brought about unprecedented opulence which perhaps gave undue importance to the manifested aspects of quantifying the results; conversely it neglected some of the human development aspects. Such approach was unequivocally loaded with certain plausibility for policy makers of the State to exercise as a way of fulfilling development. They were important aspects of development. However, an equitable development for sustainable holistic growth needs primacy in understanding what development in its true sense should be. While critically assessing different social and political theories, an argument on development is built with Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen's perspective on human freedom, capability approach and non-relativism of virtue. What is also being argued is to account 'development for well-being' as an integral part of State policy and implementation for a holistic and sustainable development. What is then development? What are the lacunas in development discourse? How do we mitigate the issues? The essay attempts to respond to some of such questions.

Keywords: Eudemonia, Doings and Beings, Functionings, Well-being, Utilitarian Approach, Capability

1.0 Introduction

This essay attempts to analyse the contemporary discourse of development in its broad sense of the term moving beyond mere idea of economic development. In this perspective, Amartya Sen has argued 'freedom' as a fundamental goal of development (Sen 2000a: 3). The utilitarian approach requiring maximisation of the sum-total of utilities of all people taken together had in fact dominated social and political theory for a very long time (Sen 1995: 13). Therefore, that approach requires revisit in the light of inclusive development approach which for example would ensure well-being and justice to different genders or sexes, the less privileged section of the society and so forth. Development in its holistic approach recognises differential needs and requirements.

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The article further focuses on constructing development as a virtue in promoting the well-being for all. Its attempt is to link the conceptual engagement of development not merely as a policy enforcement promoting the visible forms but as a virtue in itself. It argues against the challenge posed by contemporary attitude tilting in relativism which considered virtue as possessing fragmented pieces.

However, the article analyses the differences; at the same time tries to see the shared values across human cultures. In this view Martha Nussbaum argues for a 'non-relative virtue' (Nussbaum 1993:243). Nussbaum's argument from Aristotelian view of human functions that claim to have validity for all human beings perhaps can be one of the important accounts of assessing the quality of human life. It brings to the discussion of the inverse relation of development and its virtue aspects in enhancing the well-being of a person. The article is not exhaustive but is an attempt to locate its relations and divergent views of different approaches.

1.1 Amartya Sen's ideas of development

When we inquire about the prosperity of a nation or a region of the world, and about the quality of life of its inhabitants, Sissy Jupe's problem still arises: how do we determine this? What information do we require? Which criteria are truly relevant to human 'thriving'? Girl number twenty quickly discerns that just knowing how much money is available for a given number of people (the analogue of GNP per capita, still widely used as a measure of quality of life) will not take us very far. For we also need, at the very least, to ask about the distribution of these resources, and what they do to people's lives (Nussbaum & Sen 1993:1).

The doubt of Sissy Jupe, a girl number twenty wanting to 'know who had got the money, and whether any of it was mine (Dickens 1854:68) is a representative concern of each person. Sissy Jupe's question tickles the alert mind and challenges the conscience of one's credulous approach to what we often consider as pacifying our existential predicaments. The prosperity of a nation is not necessarily determined by the wealth the nation possess, but on account of how well she does with her life; with the distributed resources. Nussbaum and Sen (1993:1) raised these concerns moving beyond the interest of mere aggregation of wealth as a yard stick to measure development. In order to have a reasonable answer to the asked questions 'about the distribution of these resources, and what they do to people's lives,' development becomes crucial in the analysis. The leverage upon which our lives are evaluated, development projects are the basic constituent of promoting one's innate capacity and understanding the well-being aspects.

In the articles *Development: Which Way Now* (1983) and *The Concept of Development* (1988), Sen gives a conceptual framework of development. He stresses the valuation aspect of 'development' and argues that the concept can and should be redefined, breaking its path from the traditional development economics which concentrated largely on economic growth in terms of gross national product and per capita income. The economic problems certainly have engineering motivation force in one kind or the other. But the success of economic growth needs to be judged in terms of what it does to the lives of the people. It is argued that assessment of development in terms of enhancing the living condition of the common people is an integral part of development.

Moreover, in *Development as Freedom* (2000a), Sen's focus is basically on expanding human freedom. The ability to define development as enhancement of human capabilities implies empowering individual freedom. The concern is on the actual achievement of the individual in terms of 'enhancing the lives we lead and the freedom we enjoy' (Sen 2000a: 14). Development in this sense is different from a macro socio-economic context of growth and is seen, rather as a question of individual inclusion and choice making capabilities. An individual's freedom to choose from the given sets of alternatives becomes the central focus, directing the agency as an integral process in the development discourse.

In order to grasp the essence of development, freedom is considered as its primary goal. Notwithstanding on building upon the transcendental notion of freedom, Sen situates the sense of enjoying freedom in the everyday life experiences and views individual's freedom as a 'social commitment' (Sen 2000a: 284). What makes the sense of freedom more meaningful is the ability to recognise the existence of different human predicaments from a broader perspective in terms of well-being and quality of life. In this context, the idea of freedom is better understood when it relates to other forms of 'unfreedoms'. The different forms of unfreedoms consist of illiteracy, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive State's deprivation, poverty, violation of elementary political freedoms and liberties, violation of women integrity, worsening threats to our environment to that of sustainability of economic and social lives (Sen 2000a: 3). Re-examining unfreedoms of different kinds which are considered as impediments from enjoying the kind of life that one wants to become is important in assessing one's well-being.

In addressing these issues and problems, the individual agency takes a priority in the process of developing well-being for the reason that individual agency and social arrangements are closely related in the removal of unfreedoms from the society (Sen 2000a: xi-xii). However, in this process of realising one's well-being, an individual cannot debunk oneself from the social milieu and 'givenness' in a particular community. A person cannot claim to live apart from the society and without the technical support of the institutions which are in the domain of public provisions – water supply, electricity, etc. It is in this social framework of the 'givenness' with its entire predicaments that the question of 'choice' becomes sensible and important.

The choice one makes in life becomes a constitutive part of understanding all that takes into questioning the notions of development, freedom, well-being, etc. In a sense, 'choice' magnifies an individual's space in the society and enhances social interactions as participating in community life that enriches true sense of relishing freedom in development. As such, 'expansion of freedom is viewed...both as the primary end and as the principal means of development' (Sen 2000a: xii.). In other words 'Development can be seen ... as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy' (ibid.:3). This demonstrates how the argument for enhancement of individual freedom can be seen through the prism of development.

1.2 Further analysis

Nevertheless, it is also essential to examine development from other dimensions of our lives. The development in the social aspects becomes paramount in enhancement of

individual lives. What creates a lacuna in the development discourse is that the social development aspects lag behind due to the robust influence that technocrats inject in our lives. It is remarkable that through social network and other available products in the markets, one can positively see a process of development (though different social networks, considered as virtual world yet an important instrument of connectivity). However, the pertinent issue which requires re-examination is not only to locate the problems of development, but also to see the reason for such hindrances to development which are found within the social set up. Often the predicaments to one's situation are attributed to circumstantial 'locatedness', but more so, reason plays an important role in social norms and activity of our lives.

In traditional society, the members would relatively feel no need to give reasons for having distinct norms and activity of men and women or gender preferences of males to females (Annas 1993: 285). The members' behaviour merely conforms to societal practices. And the reasons are typically given through various assertions – boys are assets to the family, boys are family bread winner, etc. In the case of gender preferences (boy over girl) or 'natality inequality' is influenced by several factors. It is in less traditional society, in which such forms of distinction based on sex largely do not exist. What is unjust are the claims made on sex roles as a kind of accepted norms for the members of the society. Moreover, many cultures at least tolerate certain amount of violence against women as acceptable – that husband can physically intimidate his wife as he thinks fit. Such convictions are deeply held in many societies (Goldstein 2002: 29). In a way, there is no good reason for such act but it is a mere form of rationalisation. Similarly, the cases of child labour, bondage labour, honour killing, missing women – 100 million missing women (Sen 1990: 259), etc. – require knowing the reason why it exists in the reflective society.

Besides upholding traditional values of gender preferences of males over females or right to property which is typically a patriarchal social set up, it is also important to see how women themselves uphold certain social practices as important values. Some values are accepted without questioning or questioning such values may invite unnecessary repercussion on women themselves. It is not 'value free' in exercising such choices but by examining human life, it gives us a sense of moral responsibility. To leave this task on women themselves is not sufficient to remove gender inequalities and other forms of values which are considered as redundant in the contemporary times. Sometimes 'beliefs' and 'myths' also play a crucial role in the judgement of making moral choice. The collective reason of the people needs to recognise the injustice in such choice and act. In order to understand the complex phenomenon of gender disparity such as honour killings, gender preferences and 'natality inequality', it is essential to see the embedded values and norms of the society. It needs to see beyond the agency of women and look for more 'critical assessment of received values' (Sen 2001 and 1995a).

The creative abilities, social opportunities and personal contributions of half of the world population cannot be confined merely to domestic work and child bearing (Drèze & Sen 2002: 272). This amount to capability deprivation and can hamper the development of a better womanhood. Participation in community activities are part of enriching one's well being. It is in this context that human rights also plays a pivotal role as a moral force for claims of denied human rights in the forms of gender discrimination and equality in social opportunity, but also an important means of entitlement. With the emancipation of women,

it also directly or indirectly emancipates to a large extent the marginalised sections of the society as well.

So what difference does development do to the lives of the people? In what way development can help the people to value human dignity? One important perspective of evaluating the development index in our lives is ‘capability approach’. (Sen 1995: 43). In capability approach it offers a range of possibilities enhancing the individual to develop in doing things that she/he has reason to value (ibid.: 82.). In order to allow enhancement of one’s capability, development can create opportunities for removal of different forms of social and economic impediments.

The ‘capability approach’ is fundamental in evaluating the freedom of the individuals and it accesses one’s capability to function in terms of the things that she/he can do. In a way, poverty is not only identified as ‘capability deprivation’, but also seen in terms of denial of rights to food and social opportunities (Sen 2000a: 87-88.). A state of poverty can be improved through development. The development can create opportunities for removal of different forms of unfreedoms. As ‘capability approach’ evaluates individual’s freedom, it enables a person to live well in life.

As Aristotle linked explicitly the richness of human life to necessity of ascertaining the ‘function of man’ and explores ‘life in the sense of activity,’ an impoverished life would imply the denial of freedom to participate in activities that a person would like to pursue and has reason to choose (Sen 2000b: 4). To deny individuals from participating in social activities can create a form of ‘social exclusion’ which may be directly related to part of capability poverty. In this connection, Sen points out that Adam Smith’s focus on the issue of deprivation as not involving in ‘being able to appear in public without shame’ is considered as a good example of capability deprivation which takes the forms of ‘social exclusion’. Smith had placed the importance of the ideas of ‘exclusion and inclusion’ as the focal point of poverty analysis as he defined ‘necessaries’ for leading minimally a good descent life (ibid.: 5).

For the human capabilities to flourish in our lives, certain prior importance requires one’s attention. A meaningful assessment of development in terms of human capabilities can be possible when fundamental deprivations are removed from the lives of the people. This may be seen not only in terms of primary needs – food, shelter and clothing, but also in terms of other fundamental necessities in our lives. When in a person’s life electricity, water supply and motorable roads are not accessible; it is difficult to see how human capabilities can become a part of development assessment. However, in fundamentals, we can still have reasons in agreement on many removable cases of injustice prevailing in the societies – the presence of widespread hunger and deprivation, the lack of schooling for the children, or the absence of public health care as affordable for the common people, child labour, and bondage labour, violence against women, marginalised community, and so on. These manifested forms of injustices which are seen as ‘capability deprivation’ are impediments to development. Such forms of impediments keeps people in bondage and leads to denial of justice in their life.

In the conceptual framework, recognition of removal of different forms of injustice requires concerted efforts at the individual and collective spheres. Such level of removal needs a coordinated effort from the policy and development of one’s inner well-being. Instilling positive vibes in the collective as well as in the individuals can enhance the

development of capability. Such holistic approach to the development can be seen as a form of sustainable goals in life. Development from this perspective requires looking beyond the cumulative assessment of wealth to well-being aspects of our live.

1.2.1 Development beyond wealth

So if development focus is to see that people lives a decent life, then it is important to look development from a broader sense which enhances the human quality of life and functioning, and not merely seen as a depleted form of wallets. The robust economic growth and competition amongst countries are clearly visible. This is a depiction of human desire to do better than what 'yesterday' had given to them. Broadly speaking, economic growth can enhance material wealth of the nation, enable construction of infrastructures, roads, hospitals and increase per capita income. It enables a person to reach out more towards other people and perhaps better business transactions can be made more mobile with the help of modern technology. With the increase of per capita income a person may have the purchasing power and can increase wants for different reasons. She/he will have new economic situation in the sense that she/he has more well-being and freedom – she/he can purchase lots of nice things for her/himself – a new car, cloths, health care and so on. She/he will have more agency freedom, for instance, she/he can also travel to far away distance or go for a holiday trip abroad (Sen 1995: 64).

This kind of commodity approach can also create difficulties when such priority is stressed beyond one's needs and comfort. It can produce bad consequences in the life of the people as to what a person *per se* does with the given wealth. One way of understanding such attitude is to define the ethical concern in such calculus approach to life. Moreover, the understanding of the goods and commodities are only extrinsically good, for 'they are good for something else' (Aristotle 1998:11). If then, wealth is just a form of conditional means, it is essential to look for development beyond wealth.

Income per capita based on GNP and economic growth in terms of goods and services are the current talks of post-war development economists and development (Crocker 1992: 590). However, it raises certain ethical concerns in the midst of running to higher the scoreboard in stock market. Sen's critique of behavioural assumptions of neo-classical economist is notable as he challenged the view that individuals make rational and utilitarian choices about their own welfare. While neo-classical economists postulate that most human beings are utility maximiser, Sen argues that for many people ethical or religious values such as virtue, stoicism, altruism, approbation and self-realisation are considered more important. Individuals can also operate with notions of moral commitments to multiple groups like family, church, class and so on that go against their narrow self interest. Bringing the ethical dimension into the discourse of economic development is seen as an important aspect (Nussbaum & Sen 1993: 160-161).

Sen argues that every theory of justice tries to argue not only as egalitarian theories, but also promotes in a way special sphere of equality. It is seen that libertarian conception of justice demands equality of freedom. Dworkin's approach (Sen 1995:12) requires equality of resources among the people and Rawls' theory of justice (Rawls 1971) demands equality of primary goods (Sen 1995: 12-13). Similarly, it is expected that the utilitarianism requires equal treatment of everyone. But Sen argues that all these theories of 'justice has serious flaws, if substantive individual freedoms are taken to be important (Sen 2000a: 56.) And he further observed that 'This diagnosis motivates the discussion of

an alternative approach to evaluation that focuses directly on freedom, seen in the form of individual capabilities to do things that a person has reason to value' (ibid.: 56).

The theories of justice leave out essential elements when considering justice between members of community namely, the capacity or the ability of people to convert whatever is given equally to them as set of essential features, into well-being or, to remain more general into something valuable to them. The focus on how well a person ought to develop from the space that she/he enjoys was not considered as primary objectives of a just society. The ability to participate in the public space without prejudice, free access to public space and social opportunities on one's own capability were some of the important aspects that took a back seat in the discussion of a just society. Broadening of the idea of justice draws our attention to 'something like opportunity under the title 'capacity' (Nussbaum & Sen 1993: 10). Moreover, it also draws our attention to the condition of a person in focussing one's nutrition level in a central sense as it is neither necessarily captured by stock of goods nor by one's welfare level like the pleasure or desire satisfaction as the person obtain from consuming of food. So in advancing from Rawls (1971), it is important to note that Sen 'proposed two large changes of view: from actual state to opportunity, and from goods (and welfare) to what he sometimes called 'functionings' (ibid.: 10.). Sen's rejection of the focus on primary goods lays on the ground that different people, even when receiving the same set of liberties or rights, can end up with very different situation, because of the very different abilities they have in converting this rights and liberties in something valuable for them.

Sen locates the general equilibrium economics dealing with critical problems of hunger and famine and recognising such approach embodies that moral philosophy and welfare economics can make to the main stream economics. His interest to evaluate economic policies in terms of their effects on the well-being of community pays great attention to ethical considerations that shape human behaviour and judgement. In a way, an ethical aspect candidly addresses the issues of human behaviour in relation to that of economic conditions. In his work entitled *On Ethics and Economics*, Sen emphasises that norms and behaviour should become more closely integrated into economic theory (Sen 1987: 2-6). The value of ethics and its relation to economic growth is taken into account as important aspects of economic development. Moving beyond the conventional 'welfarist' position to the focus on well-being, development from the 'well-being aspect' offers a better form of evaluating the quality of a person's being.

1.2.2 Virtue in development

In constructing development as a form of virtue, it will be interesting to see Aristotle's philosophical implication of virtue and its relevance to the contemporary discourse. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle writes 'wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is mere useful and for the sake of something else' (Aristotle 1998:7). The search for accumulating wealth for its own sake is certainly not good as there are higher forms that our action can aim at. What then is this 'for the sake of something else'. Aristotle considers *Eudemonia*¹ is the good and that wealth is just a mean for realising that end. This reflects moral concerns in heaping up wealth for one's own comfort and takes it as an end in itself; rather than realising that wealth are good only for achieving for some other purpose. The purpose of wealth is to enhance one's well-being and quality of life.

The economic growth or increase of per capita income GNP are but only means and sometimes not very good means as they are means for something else. Basically the end implying how well the GNP or opulence really do to the well-being of our lives is crucial in evaluating the given wealth at our disposal. Converting wealth into well-being state of life becomes a defining aspect in the developmental process. Accordingly, development as both theory and practice should be defined in relation to what a person can and should be. Nussbaum further develops Aristotle's notion of human capability (Greek-*dunamis*) and functioning (Greek-*energeia*) as an approach to enhance human capability through capability approach. It emphasises functional capabilities to live to old age, engage in economic transactions or participate in political activities, etc. (Nussbaum 1997: 275-276). Sen employs the term 'functionings' to encompass these 'beings and doings'² that a person can achieve. If prosperity of material wealth is not development, what then is development? The reply to this question, development would be defined mean the enhancement of certain human functionings and the expansion of human capabilities to do those functionings. Arguably, the notion of 'functionings' is closely related to 'capability to function' (Sen 1995: 40). It is through actualising these functionings that different forms of inequalities/unfreedoms such as poverty, illiteracy, can be removed, and it gives an individual a sense of freedom, to lead a life as one chooses to lead. The nature of capabilities is to function in a way human beings have reason to value is considered 'as an aspect of living well' (Drydyk 2004: 8). Restriction and non-restriction in allowing a person to exercise one's capabilities becomes comparative in assessing one's well-being of life.

Development consists not just closing the existence of inequalities/unfreedoms, but also raising the capabilities of a person. And the capabilities of a person can be enhanced if we understand the common problems faced across cultures and beliefs. Many of the most urgent problems of justice and distribution that human beings face who live within nation-states are problems, requiring worldwide communication and common effort for their effective solution. In the early Greek philosophers – Plato and Aristotle who defined city-state in a demarcated boundary based on the city wall may have been able to think of 'water' and 'air' as problems that each city can face on its own (Nussbaum 1993: 207). These problems are not region specific; but they are now common problems for humanity. They require much wider attention and are concern for well-being of the people. Some of the social norms and conventions do not really give us reason for all that we do in our lives. We are often faced with moral dilemma in taking decisions and making choices, which in a way puts us into more difficult situation. Perhaps Aristotle's virtue ethics which has resurfaced in the current ethical debates can dispel uneasiness in taking up such discourse while focussing on the well-being and quality of life.

The Greek philosophers - Plato and Aristotle gave the idea of virtue with its philosophical underpinning although the usage had appeared in several traditions in the West. This only shows the Greek word '*eudemonia*' is not only interpreted but re-interpreted while enriching with new meanings as human rationality takes on a new paradigm shift. The term *eudemonia* is translated as 'happiness', 'well-being', 'blessedness' and 'human flourishing' as used by different thinkers like W. D Ross, Alsandair Mac Intyre, Federick Coplestone S.J³ and Martha Nussbaum. We find that *eudemonia* carries intrinsic values in moral virtue as an aim to achieve the greatest good. *Eudemonia* characterises a well lived life.

We find that virtues are shaped according to societal needs in a period of history and tend to change with the progression of development. There are virtues like honesty and

justice which are considered as universal, and we hold them as ‘morally virtuous’ by the society. But we also find that some of the virtues are contextual in nature. Either such virtue lapses or takes on new meanings with time and situation. For instance, chastity which was considered as a virtue in early centuries underwent a considerable revision in people’s outlook and is no more considered a virtue by the society. Virtue also changes along with the passage of time (Nussbaum 1993: 243).

Nussbaum defended the non-relative virtues of Aristotle. She interprets Aristotle’s view on virtue ethics as a universal. The virtues like justice, temperance, honesty, generosity, etc. are essential to human flourishing and well-being in all societies and in all times. Nussbaum exploring on human dignity, believes that recognising respect, value or for that matter admiring people for their dignity, we exhibit certain common goodness in human being. This reflects that one’s concern is shared with others. Nussbaum argues that

... relativist may think that any list of virtues must be simply a reflection of local traditions and values, and that virtues being (unlike Kantian principles and utilitarian algorithms) concrete and closely tied to forms of life, there can in fact be no list of virtues that will serve as normative for all these varied societies (ibid.: 243).

In response to relativists, Nussbaum argues that Aristotle virtues enumerates human experience that figures in human life, and that in all possibility human being will have to make some choices which will be good for the society. For that matter ethics progresses like the progress in scientific understanding, finding the correct and fuller way of understanding of the specification of virtue (ibid.: 248). Nussbaum in support of Aristotle’s non-relative virtues argues further that there are spheres of shared human experience that lies at the heart of Aristotelian approach. The normative conception in a way introduces the elements of cultural interpretation; however, the fundamental virtues that human beings aspire for are invariable across cultures. The idea of courage may be debated as to which form is appropriate, but the fear of death is shared by all human beings. Again the idea of moderation may vary, but we find that the experiences of hunger, thirst and sexual desire are invariant (ibid.:252). The concern for cultural search about virtue suggests that it is not the only way how the ancestors perceive it, but it is for the good. And where the virtues are concerned a unified practical solution is sought by the actual participants in a community life.

There are certain ways in which people may criticise the ways the world is looked at as Aristotle criticised the socio-political conditions of his time. And the standards used in such criticisms do come from inside human life. Despite the differences that we find in evidences in the specific cultural shaping of the experiences, we do recognise the experience of people in other cultures as similar to our own. We do converse with them matters of deep importance, understand them and allow ourselves to be moved by them. This sense of community that people have overlaps and seems strong in the area of grounding experiences (ibid.: 258).

As ethical virtue is something which is found across shared cultures in spite of certain cultural beliefs and practices, it is important to locate development as an activity which promotes human well-being. A development activity which consists of not only the economic life of a community, but also directing such activities to the development of the people can be truly essential for flourishing human life. Looking at the development from

a broader perspective of well-being and quality of life takes on a new paradigm shift from the welfarits/utilitarian approach of merely allowing an agent as a recipient. In a way the development project by itself will not weight much merits unless the well-being aspects are considered as a central evaluative goal of the development. A development taking care of well-being aspects is worth the merits. This makes sense when we talk of freedom to enjoy life in terms of ‘doings and beings’ as enhancement of individual well-beings. Such an enterprise is made possible through the work of development.

Doing well and living well is a virtue. And these are seen in terms of good health, education, sanitation, being well nourished, being free from avoidable morbidity, being able to move about as desired. The ‘doings’ and ‘beings’ are generically considered as ‘functionings’ of a person. Any forms of social maladies, violation of civil and political rights of the individuals, denial of fundamental needs, social exclusion, gender violence, instituted violence, to mention few are certainly not in a good taste for enhancement of human well-being. The concept of development is essential to economics in general; however, the success of development has to be seen in terms of what it does to the lives of human beings. As the wealth are merely good for something else, this brings us to reflect on deeper meaning of living well and doing well in our lives. Perhaps, virtue ethics can helps us in grounding ourselves conceptually in certain values about human life and its relations to other forms of life.

1.3 Conclusion

Eudemonia – well-being and quality of life has an intrinsic value in conceptualising development. The fundamental values that we hold as essential would be meaningless without such values in the discourse of human relationship. Understanding development in the light of enhancing well-being and quality of life provides better approach to human development than utility and quantifiable approaches. In a way, the moral appropriateness of the concepts of functioning of what people can and be able to do in life widens the scope of a person and that is seen through the development itself. This account of functioning ability scores validity for all human beings and enhances capability of a person. In attempting to locate the elements of virtues in development, it is suggested that the development by itself will be not better than the commodity and utility approaches if the intrinsic values of well-being and quality of life are excluded in the development discourse. The evaluative space in terms of functionings and capabilities to function takes on a higher ground in accessing the development as a virtue. Of course, non-development or ‘unfreedoms’ of different kinds are certainly not good; to seek development for enhancement of one’s well-being can be a desirable action for policy maker to promote a sustainable development for all.

Notes

1. In *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle (1998) considered that wealth are only means to achieving the well being state of our lives, and that in a given situation, reason should guide an ethical choice in bring about eudemonia as the highest good.
2. The phrase ‘beings and doings’ are used interchangeably as ‘doings and beings’ found in writings of Sen (1995:40-43 and 1989). This phrase is used in Agarwal et al. (2006).
3. See in Aristotle (1998), MacIntyre (1998), and Copleston (1962). The term *Eudaimonia* translated from the Greek work as happiness was considered too narrow in meaning by these thinkers. And due to its narrow understanding of its meaning, the applications to social and political

theories were grounded merely from the utilitarian model of development. Such approach was challenged, and in order to enrich its meaning in relating with the contemporary idea on development, Ross, MacIntyre, Copleston and Nussbaum (1993) had broadened the meaning of *Eudaimonia* to include the widest range possible of human existence.

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